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The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when 
they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful 
than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by 
little else. (cited from Holcombe 1994, 386) 
J.M. Keynes 
I am inclined to believe that monopoly and other imperfections 
are at least as important, and perhaps substantially more so, 
in the political sector as in the market place. (Becker 1976, 
37) 
G. Becker 
I. Introduction 
In 1993 Bill Clinton nominated Lani Guinier to head the civil rights 
division of the Department of Justice. Soon after, Guinier's nomination 
became embroiled in controversy when the media and conservative 
legislators began to examine her writings on electoral remedies to Voting 
Rights Act violations. Almost immediately, Lani Guinier became known as 
the "quota queen" and her writings were derided as undemocratic and 
racially preferential. Still smarting from "nanny-gate," President Clinton 
quickly moved to avoid further attacks and withdrew Guinier's nomination. 
Foremost among the charges raised against Guinier was that her 
advocation of cumulative voting as an alternative to districting as a 
remedy for minority voting strength dilution represented an affront to 
democracy and was designed to unfairly advantage minorities. 
Unfortunately, the truth was somehow lost in the fury of political 
maneuvering and press sensationalism. 
Lani Guinier's proposals were neither radical nor undemocratic. In 
fact, cumulative voting (CV) is more efficient, democratic, and fair than 
the plurality rule single member district (SMD) arrangement currently in 
use in most of the United States that Guinier's critics held up as the 
paragon of democracy. The importance of these qualities, especially to 
minorities in a pluralistic democracy, cannot be overstated. Efficient, 
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democratic, and fair electoral systems prevent government from ignoring 
minority rights and interests by turning mere enfranchisement into 
empowerment, which in turn, affords minorities the same access to and 
proportionate power in America's social, economic, and political 
institutions. 
Evidence to support the claimed superiority of cumulative voting can 
be found in the literature on voting theory, comparative politics, public 
choice, and voting rights, but this study will focus on a relatively 
unexplored approach to electoral systems. Single member district, 
plurality rule will be compared to cumulative voting within the industrial 
organization paradigm,' in order to examine each system's effects in 
terms of efficiency, democracy, and fairness. It will be argued that 
cumulative voting, among other things, better reflects consumer 
preferences, induces more and better competition in elections, and 
prevents majority "monopolization" of the political process. As the United 
States and other nations begin to recognize the pluralistic nature of their 
societies, and as new nations embrace democracy and individual liberty, 
cumulative voting is an alternative that should be, and increasingly is, 
considered for use. Therefore, this study is important in that it sheds 
light on cumulative voting and adds to the evidence supporting the 
system's use. 
First, in Section II, efficiency, democracy, and fairness, the criteria 
for evaluating the merits of an electoral system will be described and 
elaborated upon in order to clarify the bases for judgements about 
cumulative voting and single member districts. Then, in Section III, 
electoral systems will be discussed, both generally, with respect to their 
composition, importance, and role in politics, and specifically, with 
, Industrial organization is the branch of economics dealing with the structure, conduct, and 
performance of markets and the firms within those markets. 
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respect to the nature and operation of cumulative voting and single 
member districts. Next, Section IV will proceed to the study's central 
focus, conceptualizing the government, CV, and SMD within the industrial 
organization paradigm to assess each system's implications for the 
criteria. Section V will go on to consider the issues raised by the 
industrial organization model, as well as the examine other arguments and 
considerations concerning the electoral systems. Then, in Section VI, the 
evidence surrounding cumulative voting and single member districts 
generated by a unique voting experiment, as well as that discovered in a 
review of the real world uses of cumulative voting, will be examined. 
Finally, Section VII will draw some overall conclusions about how 
cumulative voting and single member districts measure up to the criteria 
and which system would be preferable. 
II. Criteria 
Efficiency, democracy, and fairness are the fundamental, and many 
times competing, values that the modern liberal state strives to embody. 
Nevertheless, these concepts are less than rigorously defined and 
consequently often confused or misapplied. Since evaluation of my 
hypothesis rests on claims about electoral systems and political 
representation in relation to these fundamental values, it is necessary to 
attempt to provide a better explanation of what is meant by these 
concepts and a way to more easily measure the degree to which an 
electoral system furthers efficiency, democracy, and fairness. Once 
defined, the essential qualities of the criteria will be distilled for use in 
systematically evaluating CV and SMD throughout the study. 
An efficient representative system promotes processes that result 
in a well functioning government where political consumers' desires are 
met in the political marketplace at a low cost. More to the point, 
efficiency is Pareto optimality. In essence, democracy is popular rule. 
• 
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Merely having elections, however, is not a full commitment to democracy. 
A true democracy strives to realize the Madisonian conception of good 
government through careful deliberation of proposals supported by the 
many interests that constitute society. Fairness is the just and proper 
treatment of individuals and other entities with respect to the division of 
social goo~s. Thus, in essence, the criteria of fairness attempts to 
measure how justly2 a system of representation treats those under that 
system. Together the criteria mark out the values that determine the 
nature of social decision making. In terms of the traditional example of 
the economic pie, the criteria work in the following way: efficiency 
governs the size of the pie, fairness governs how the pie is divided, and 
democracy governs who decides these questions. 
To operationalize the criteria for use in evaluating SMD and CV, it is 
helpful to distill the essential qualities of efficiency, democracy, and 
fairness as they pertain to electoral systems. Six qualities, each one 
promoting one or more of the criteria, will be used to measure the 
attributes of each system. Two of the qualities, competition and 
representation, promote a pair of criteria, thus having dual significance. 
First, competition describes the number and quality of alternatives 
available. In terms of efficiency this is valuable because providing what 
consumers want at the lowest possible price is one of its commonly 
recognized by-products. For democracy, competition assures that the 
political arena is open to a multitude of viewpoints and that minority 
2Justice, despite the best efforts of philosophers, is still a concept that lacks any kind of 
consensus, in the way that efficiency and democracy have one. Thus, there are varying and 
competing concepts of justice, most famous among them divine right, utilitarianism, 
communitarianism, and egalitarianism, Marxism but for the most part I will adopt a Rawlsian 
conception of justice. For those unfamiliar with Rawls' conception it is laid out in his A Theory 
of Justice and supplemented by his Political Liberalism. Briefly, his theory posits principles of 
justice that in the special conception claims each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others and social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both reasonably expected to be to everyone's 
advantage, and attach to positions and offices open to all (Rawls 1971, 3-16). 
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interests, broadly speaking, are involved in the electoral and political 
systems. Second, representation describes the relationship between the 
people and their interests, and the government and its makeup.3 
Representation for democracy means that those in charge of the 
government will be a reflection of the will of the citizens. Implicit in this 
statement are two concepts, majority rule and effective society wide 
representation. Fair representation, in a sense, goes above and beyond 
democratic representation. It attempts to ensure that all relevant 
interests are adequately provided for in the representative system. 
The last four qualities describe only one criteria a piece: stability 
and responsiveness for efficiency, participation for democracy, and policy 
outcomes for fairness. Stability reflects the strength of a society's 
political institutions as well as the degree to which power is 
concentrated over time in particular interests. Responsiveness describes 
the degree to which a representative system is truly interactive in the 
sense that consumer desires are manifested in the political system in a . 
timely and accurate fashion.4 Participation serves to ensure the 
involvement of the citizens in their government. Finally, fairness 
measured through policy outcomes requires the examination of policy 
outputs to determine if they uphold the principles of justice for all of 
society. Thus, throughout this study efficiency will be measured by 
competition, stability, and responsiveness, democracy by representation, 
competition, and participation, and fairness by representation and policy.S 
3A large amount of literature in political science deals with this conception and it many facets. 
For simplicity sake I am not going to deal with controversies such as the delegate trustee 
problem, nor with interpretations such as elite theory. 
4Stability and responsiveness, although they many times do work in opposite directions and can 
be related, are not two ends of the same continuum where an increase in stability also by 
definition decreases responsiveness. It is conceivable that a government may be very stable and 
very responsive as in the case of a benevolent aristocracy. 
Sin evaluating electoral systems, improvement in one criteria or quality often cause a 
worsening in another. In these cases, it must be remembered that not all criteria and qualities 
have the same value. In other words, some criteria and qualities are more important. In 
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III. Electoral Systems 
Electoral systems are not a simple matter of reflection, abstracted 
from politics. They are completely interactive, in the sense that they can 
be altered by the manipulation of certain variables and can themselves 
alter a wide range of behavior. Thus, the type of system used has a 
profound effect on how the entire political environment is constituted. 
A. Aspects of Electoral Systems 
Electoral systems generally have three aspects that are open to 
variation; balloting, districting, and electoral formula (Rae 1967). 
Balloting is the "specification of the voter's role in deciding the election" 
(16). In other words, balloting instructs the voter how to vote in terms of 
the number of votes cast, the way the votes can be arranged, and whether 
voters vote for parties or candidates. 
Districting produces lithe units within which voting returns are 
translated into distributions of parliamentary seats II (19). The importance 
of the districting process is that the magnitude of districts, or number of 
seats per electoral unit, determines the degree of proportionality of 
representation from the district (20). Generally, the more seats available 
in a district, the more proportional the district's representation will be. A 
closely related concept is that of exclusion threshold, because it is a 
function of the number of seats available in a district.6 The exclusion 
threshold is the percentage of votes needed to assure victory, thus the 
more seats available the lower the threshold (Still 1992; Guinier 1994; 
Rae 1995). 
Electoral formulae provide the method of translating votes into 
outcomes, in essence deciding who won and who lost. There are primarily 
addition, which these are depends on the nature of current circumstances. For instance, 
responsiveness may be more valuable than stability in a very unresponsive, yet very stable 
government, whereas it may be otherwise in a different government situation. 
61n both CV and 5MD plurality the exclusion threshold is 1/(1 +5), where 5 is the number of 
seats available in the district. 
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two types of formula in use,? the plurality rule, and proportional 
representation (PR). The plurality system elects the person or party with 
the most votes, regardless of what portion of the total that is, as the only 
winner from a field of candidates. Proportional representation., 
conversely, elects multiple candidates or parties according to their 
proportional strength in the electorate and the percentage needed to gain a 
seat. Because different concepts, approaches, and combinations of 
approaches can alter each variable of an electoral system there is no limit 
to the number of possible electoral systems (Ljjphart 1990). 
If an electoral system merely served as a mirror reflecting voter 
preferences without manipulation, the fact that there are many possible 
systems wouldn't really matter. But in reality, perfect translation is 
impossible primarily because outcomes of elections cannot reflect the 
complicated and multidimensional nature of voter preferences. Thus 
choosing an electoral system requires making a choice from a number of 
imperfect alternatives. Each of these alternatives manipulates the three 
electoral system variables, producing different results by emphasizing or 
privileging different ways of reflecting voter preferences.8 
B. Electoral Phenomena 
It may be recognized that electoral systems do matter, but to 
actually determine the effects of different systems, it is important to 
explain how systems matter. The ways in which systems matter, referred 
to here as electoral phenomena, are the aspects of a political system that 
can change when electoral systems are altered. And its is differences in 
7A third formula is the majoritarian system which requires that the winner be able to beat all 
other candidates or parties combined, meaning the winner has to garner at least fifty percent of 
the votes. The difficult of achieving this feat has made majoritarian systems rare, and thus it 
has been left out. 
8A caveat may be needed here to clarify my argument. I am arguing that electoral systems 
matter in a number of ways to society and its institutions, but I am not claiming that electoral 
systems are the only variable. Many political, social, and economic factors particular to each 
society interact with electoral systems to influence how the political system works. 
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these electoral phenomena that this study attempts to measure. In other 
words, while the criteria are how electoral systems are evaluated, the 
electoral phenomena are what are being evaluated. 
The electoral phenomena are the tangible effects of altering aspects 
of the electoral system in the public policy arena and the political culture. 
Each of the electoral phenomena is important because it can manipulated 
in such a way as to help achieve desired political, social, economic, or 
other outcomes. Electoral phenomena, such as competition, minority 
representation, stability, political behavior, accurate representation, 
districting, strategy, and participation, have significant consequences in 
the public policy arena and the political culture. 
Competition is the number and quality of contenders, and influences 
the representativeness and responsiveness of political structures, as well 
as contributing to participation in the political realm. Minority 
representation describes the degree to which the voices of those not in 
the majority are heard in the political system. It serves to reduce the 
effective power of the majority by making it more difficult to enact 
proposals that exclude minorities from benefits or place inordinate costs 
on minorities, encourages coalitions to form more consensual policies as 
the non-anonymous character of law making bodies makes legislators 
more likely to compromise, allows minorities to be involved and gain 
political experience, and is symbolic of a commitment to pluralism and 
opposition to social polarization. Stability is the degree to which political 
institutions remain strong, viable, and constant over time, and prevents 
the rapid turnover and governmental fragmentation that can weaken the 
ability of a government to create good and substantive policies. 
Political behavior describes the actions and attitudes of voters and 
representatives concerning legislation and representation, and can affect 
the quality of law making by determining the role and importance of 
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deliberation and consensus, and the degree to which representatives are 
public interested. Accurate representation describes how well a 
representative body reflects the interests and preferences of an 
electorate, and can make political institutions a better reflection of 
popular will, induce participation, and introduce instability. Strategy 
entails the introduction of factors other than simple preference into the 
voting or electoral decision, and can skew accurate representation and 
make voting more complicated. Participation describes the size and 
quality of the electorate, and furthers society wide involvement in the 
political process. Districting describes how political entities are divided 
for the purpose of representation, and plays a role in the politicization of 
the process and through larger, less important districts contributes to the 
public interestedness of political behavior (Karlan 1989; Austen-Smith 
and Banks 1988; Lakeman 1974, 29; Rae 1967; Arrow 1963; Guinier 1994). 
How each of the electoral phenomena are influenced by SMD and CV will be 
explored and evaluated vis a vis the criteria qualities in Sections IV, V, . 
and VI. 
C. Single Member Districts (SMD) 
The most common electoral system in the United States is the single 
member district with plurality rule. It is best analyzed in terms of the 
three aspects of electoral systems introduced above. In the balloting 
aspect, the voter is presented with a series of candidates and is asked to 
cast a vote for one. Districting in this system divides a geopolitical 
entity9 in which an election is taking place into equally populated 
9A geopolitical unit is geographic area defined by a political jurisdiction. For example, towns, 
counties, and states all can be considered geopolitical units. In addition, voting districts can also 
be considered a geopolitical unit, but many times the arbitrary and illogical definition of these 
districts prevents them from being genuine geopolitical units, that have an identity apart from 
their role in the electoral process. 
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districts,10 equivalent in number to the quantity of seats available in the 
elected body.11 With one seat per district the exclusion threshold would be 
50%, therefore requiring a candidate to receive half the electorates votes 
to be guaranteed victory. Then the electoral formula, plurality rule, 
designates the one candidate in each district with the most votes as the 
winner. For example, SMD would divide a state with a 35 person 
legislature into 35 equally populated districts, from which voters, casting 
one vote a piece, would elect the top vote getter from each district. 
D. Cumulative Voting (CV) 
Cumulative voting is a semi-proportional electoral system 
combining aspects of plurality and proportional systems. In the balloting 
aspect, each voter is given a quantity of votes equal to the number of 
seats available within the district. Voters are then able to distribute 
their votes among the candidates in any way they wish, including placing 
multiple votes on individual candidates. For example, in a district with 
three seats up for election, a voter may place one vote on each of three 
candidates, or may place two votes on one candidate and one on another, or 
may place all three votes on one candidate.12,13 
Districting varies with CV. It could leave the geopolitical entity 
intact, thereby placing all voters in the same district, or it could divide 
the electorate into districts. Nevertheless, each district, to be effective,· 
must have multiple seats available in each election. When CV creates 
multiple districts, they are usually identifiable geopolitical subdivisions 
10Prior to the early sixties when a series of court cases, (Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960), 
Baker v. Carr (1962), Gray v. Sanders (1963), Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), and Reynolds 
v. Sims (1964» created the "one man one vote" standard, districts did not have to be, and were 
rarely, equally populated.
 
11 Through the process of reapportionment, districts are redrawn to adjust to population shifts
 
on a regular basis. In America this occurs every ten years, coinciding with the census.
 
12The practice of placing all of one's votes on a single candidate is called plumping. 
13The question of using fractional votes to allow voters to equally divide their votes among any 
number of candidates, say 1.5 votes for each of two candidates, is an implementation question 
and has no implications for this study. 
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and do not necessarily have to be equally populated, because the seats 
available are apportioned to the districts according to population. By way 
of example, Lani Guinier suggests that if CV were used in New York City, 
the city could be divided into its five boroughs and each borough would 
have a quantity of city council seats proportionate to their respective 
populations (155). Furthermore, the fact that each district contains 
multiple seats drives the exclusion threshold down. With five open seats, 
the threshold is 1/6 or 16.7%, thus requiring a candidate to garner only a 
little less than 17% to be guaranteed victory. 
The electoral formula in CV is semi-proportional in that it elects 
more than one candidate, and thus is not "winner-take-all," and yet does 
not allocate seats in strict proportion to votes, but rather grants one seat 
to each of the winners, no matter how many votes they get. For instance, 
in a three seat race, the top three vote getters in the election would each 
win a seat, even if the first place winner had twice as many votes as the 
second or third place winners. (Guinier 1994; Lakeman 1974, 87-90; Still 
1984). 
IV. An Industrial Organization Interpretation of Government 
Just as with economic institutions, a society's political institutions 
are made up of many structures that determine the conduct and 
performance of actors within those institutions. Legislatures, 
constitutions, and electoral systems are but a few of such structures that 
provide a system of rules and incentives that influence political behavior 
and outcomes (Myerson 1995). Thus, an analysis of government within the 
industrial organization paradigm can provide some valuable insights into 
the role of different political structures. The implication for studying 
electoral systems is that much of the economic theory of competition, 
efficiency, consumer welfare, and fairness that has developed in 
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industrial organization theory can shed light on these phenomena in the 
political realm. 
For the purpose of this study, I have developed a dual level model of 
government markets. There is a market for the outputs of government, as 
well as a market for inputs. The output market deals with the production 
of government policy, while the input market deals with the selection of 
those who create the policy, the governors. Thus, the theory envisions two 
markets at subsequent stages in the political process, just as the markets 
for steel and automobiles are subsequent stages in the production process. 
Although the primary focus of this study is on the second of the input 
market, or the electoral system, the interactive effects of the political 
system make it helpful to briefly explain and examine the policy output 
market. 
A. Outputs- Government as Monopoly 
Viewing the market for political outputs from within the industrial 
organization paradigm recasts some familiar aspects of the political 
system in some new, yet helpful terms. The government is the producer, 
citizens are consumers, the political entity is the market, and policy is 
the good. Because government is the only producer of political and policy 
outputs, and there can only be one government per market (national, state, 
local) at a time, the market structure can be conceived of as a natural 
monopolY,14 with the governors in power as monopolists (Tullock 1955, 
458-9). For instance, the a city council has a monopoly on producing city 
ordinances, regulations, policies, expenditures, and certain services 
(Holcombe 1994). 
14Following Crain, Holcombe, and Tollison (1979), marginal cost would be constant because 
each additional policy action within a given government involves the same "processing and 
approval procedures"(S4-5). But average cost would be declining because there is a fixed cost 
of gaining control of the monopoly (government). Government output in terms of policy etc. 
would be determined by marginal valuation and the average cost. Furthermore, the fixed cost can 
be expected to be quite high and thereby impose a kind of entry barrier that protects the status 
quo government from competition for its monopoly rights. 
• 
14 
Just as society faces alternatives in dealing with natural 
monopolies in industry, it must also decide how to treat the sovereign 
monopoly. Tullock cites three common approaches; laissez-faire non­
control, regulation, and public ownership (1955,458). A hands off 
approach gives government the kind of unacceptable free reign that has 
not been accepted since the fall of the divine monarchies. In addition, it 
allows possessors of the monopoly rights to erect insurmountable 
barriers to entry. Public ownership surely exists, but it is public 
operation that is lacking. And in view of Arrow's impossibility theorem,15 
the inevitability of self-interest in representation, and the massive costs 
of direct democracy, public operation is unlikely. Regulation is also 
unacceptable because of the undemocratic control it would necessitate. 
Although, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the common law all are 
examples of useful, and essential, regulatory schemes designed to control 
government monopoly, regulation of this type over every aspect of 
governmental action is unwarranted because it would completely insula~e 
government from "consumer sovereignty" (Holcombe 1994, 146; Tullock 
1955, 459). Consequently, another scheme must be relied on to restrain 
government monopoly power. 
B. Inputs- The Market for Governors 
From a market point of view, the best strategy would be to reduce 
the height of the entry barriers that allow monopolies to fight off 
challengers. Regular, competitive, democratic auctions of the publicly 
owned government's monopoly rights to interested parties serve this 
function well. In other words, allowing consumers to control the market 
15Arrow proved that no system of aggregating society's preferences could be devised that would 
meet five innocuous requirements (Arrow 1963). 
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for inputs, or governors, regulates the market for outputs, or government 
policy.16 
Within the industrial organization paradigm, electoral systems can 
be seen as market structures in the market that determines who will 
govern. The market is the geopolitical voting unit, the firms are the 
various candidates, the good that is being offered is government policy, 
and the consumer is the government. Government demand, however is a 
derived demand coming from voters, just as auto industry demand for 
steel is derived from auto purchasers. Giving the electorate complete 
control over the input market, as elections do, replaces the government 
with the electorate as the consumer. Thus in each election, in each 
geopolitical unit, candidates design and offer their product in hopes of 
attracting voters, because the candidate(s) with the largest IImarket 
sharell on election day will be chosen by the electorate as the firm, that 
will become the government monopoly.. Demsetz suggests that as 
candidates and parties bid for votes with promises of policy measures, 
competition will eat away any monopoly profits, and make government a 
reflection of popular sentiment (Holcombe 1994, 146-7). This analysis is 
flawed however because it assumes perfect competition for the monopoly 
rights of government. 
Non-competitive aspects of the electoral process have two sources;· 
the status quo owner of monopoly rights, and the electoral system itself. 
Because governments, or majorities in democratic nations, have almost 
unlimited monopoly power, government officials who want to continue to 
earn the benefits of monopoly power,l? will use those powers to help 
161n my model the input market is not traditional input market described by the circular 
production flow concept. Rather it is only the first stage of a two stage consumer market. 
l?These benefits include not only the monetary rewards of government service, but also the 
prestige and other psychic benefits of government positions. Monopoly power also entails the 
ability of a legislator to deviate from the societally optimal production of services, in favor of 
the most personally profitable production point. 
• 
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maintain their position by erecting barriers with which potential 
competitors must contend. Examples of this type of behavior in the 
American political system abound. The seniority system in Congress gives 
voters incentive to keep re-electing their representative so that he/she 
can provide better pork to the district. Also campaign financing, the 
franking privilege, and media coverage are all manipulated in favor of 
sitting legislators (Holcombe 1994, 98). The degree to which American 
legislators can advantage themselves by exploiting their monopoly status 
is fortunately limited by the competition introduced by the monopoly 
regulation found in the constitutional restrictions placed on government 
such as the free press, free speech, the separation of powers, and 
federalism (Holcombe 1994, 146-7). 
Perhaps the greatest determinant of competition is a very subtle one 
in American politics, the electoral system. As was argued above, the 
system matters. Different electoral systems can have quite different 
impacts on processes and outcomes throughout the political realm. 
Certainly, the voting system employed contributes significantly to the 
number, quality, and behavior of competitors and potential competitors by 
placing barriers on their quantity and positioning. Also, government will 
reflect citizen preferences to varying degrees and in different ways 
because electoral systems transform preferences into outcomes 
differently. From analyzing the amount and type of competition generated, 
electoral systems can be classified as to the type of market structure 
they represent within the two level industrial organization model. It will 
be posited that SMD, because of the type of competition it engenders, is an 
oligopolistic market structure. Likewise, the competition involved in CV 
makes it a monopolistically competitive structure. Once classified, 
further claims can be made concerning the electoral phenomena generated 
by each market structure. Ultimately, these phenomena will be used to 
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evaluate the electoral systems according to the criteria qualities set out 
in Section II. 
C. SMD as Oligopoly 
An oligopoly exists in an industry when a small number of firms 
dominate the market. Similarly, a political oligopoly can be said to be 
present in the political market for the government's monopoly powers 
when a few candidates and or parties dominate the electoral process. 
Certainly the two-party dominated history of elections in the U.S. under 
SMD plurality rule makes a prima facie case for the existence of an 
oligopoly. There is evidence, however, that oligopolies are inherent in 
single member plurality electoral systems. Douglas Rae in his examination 
of electoral laws finds a "very strong relationship" between plurality 
electoral systems and two party system (1967, 95), that is unequivocally 
confirmed by Lijphart's study twenty years later (1990). 
Further evidence of the oligopolistic nature of the American system 
can be found in manifestations of market power and the existence of entry 
barriers. Duverger's Law claims that the "plurality method, by 
discriminating against small parties, encourages a two-party system" 
(Lliphart and Grofman 1984, 5; Myerson 1995). Voter strategy causes only 
the two strongest parties to be taken seriously, because votes for weak 
parties are considered wasted. Thus, plurality rule restricts competition . 
from third parties and strengthens the established, dominant producers 
(Myerson 1995). 
Furthermore, the Median Voter Model hypothesizes that in plurality 
single winner elections, where issues are one dimensional and voter's 
preferences are single peaked, the candidate who has the support of the 
median voter will win. Because candidates in plurality elections attempt 
to maximize votes, in positioning their candidacy they will tend toward 
the median voter (Nicholson 1992, 783; Downs 1957,139-41). This effect 
• 
18 
tends to push candidates ideologically and policy-wise together and 
discourage significant deviation from the median, thus reducing the range 
and quality of competition. The evidence for convergence is reinforced by 
Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation which predicts 
competitors, in deciding where to locate on a continuum, will choose to 
situate themselves at the median in order to maximize profits, thereby 
causing consumers a welfare loss. Extending this to the political market 
suggests that candidates will converge on the median voter, presenting 
the voter with "excessive sameness" (Shepsle and Cohen 1990, 17; 
Myerson 1995). 
Scholars have suggested shortcomings in the convergence model of 
plurality elections. First, an election with more than two candidates will 
not produce convergence (Shepsle and Cohen 1990; Grofman 1993; Cox 
1987). In addition, potential competition will prevent convergence in a 
two candidate race (Shepsle and Cohen 1990, 28-29). These 
nonconvergence effects are militated against by the oligopolistic nature. 
of SMD plurality rule, however. First, as discussed above, pluralities tend 
toward two competitor races, thus reducing the possibility of a multiple 
candidate race. Furthermore, the collusive aspect of the potential 
competition effect preempts the introduction of the multiple candidate 
effect, in the sense that the two candidates move apart on an ideological . 
scale so as to prevent candidate entry on their ideological flanks. Also, 
Cox suggests that SMD plurality voting is highly centripetal in candidate 
issue positioning (1990). 
Both Hotelling and Downs suggest that convergence is a negative 
aspect of political competition. Myerson, however, rejects the conclusion 
that it harms the voter, showing instead that convergence, in addition to 
being the optimal candidate strategy, is also the best outcome for 
consumers because it minimizes the distance between voters and the 
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ultimate single winner (1995). Thus, a properly functioning SMD plurality 
system produces convergence, thereby limiting the quantity and quality of 
competition. 
Oligopolies must also resort to entry barriers to reduce the threat 
of competition. These take at least three forms. The institutional barriers 
that the status quo government erects not only protect government 
monopoly power, but also preserve oligopolistic competition for that 
power through the electoral rules18 that are established. Also, third party 
barriers are erected by the 50% exclusion threshold of plurality rule and 
the Duverger effect that discourages all but the two strongest parties. 
Finally, districting reduces competition in two ways. It limits 
competition by making the jurisdiction that elects a representative 
smaller. And, the arbitrary nature of the districting tool allows and, in 
fact, encourages the creation of "safe districts", or the use of "vote 
dilution", which are designed solely to undermine competition. Any 
remaining distance between the median voter and the positions taken by , 
candidates to prevent entry, is lost in the candidates' intentional 
ambiguity which allows them to simultaneously converge on the median 
voter and appear to "hold down the fort." As Downs says, " ...parties will try 
to be similar and equivocate" (1965, 137). In these ways oligopoly market 
power is used to reduce competitiveness, while at the same time 
eliminate differentiation. 
Evaluation 
The clear conclusions of placing single member district plurality 
rule in the oligopoly model are that SMD exhibits reduced competition and 
a strong tendency toward undifferentiated political centrism. These 
conclusions have many implications for the electoral phenomena, which in 
18Registration, polling, and politicking rules, such as those instituted in Jim Crow regimes are 
examples of this type of entry barrier. 
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turn become the bases for some tentative evaluations of SMD. Certainly, 
the phenomenon most clearly affected is that of competition. The 
oligopoly market structure prevalent in SMD plurality rule restricts both 
the quantity and quality, in terms of differentiation, of competitors. This 
has natural and expected negative consequences for efficient and 
democratic competition. In addition, limiting competition has an adverse 
effect on participation as the lack of good competitive alternatives 
causes people to lose interest. Furthermore, the lack of good alternatives 
that is due to the absence of differentiation in electoral politics leads to 
inaccurate representation and minority exclusion which makes democratic 
and fair representation, especially for minorities out of the centrist 
mainstream, more difficult and less likely. 
D. CV as Monopolistic Competition 
Cumulative voting approximates monopolistic competition in form 
and function. Like a monopolistically competitive industry, CV usually has 
quite a few candidates, and the candidates are differentiated. Also, 
cumulative voting engenders vigorous competition, in which candidates 
try to carve out a niche to remain successful, just as firms do in the 
market. Thus, the two distinguishing characteristics of cumulative voting 
in the monopolistic competition paradigm are competition and 
differentiation. 
Because cumulative voting has more than one seat at stake in an 
election, typically more candidates will compete for office, thus making 
elections more competitive. The cumulative aspect of the process, in 
which voters are able to "plump" votes, allows a certain degree of 
preference intensity revelation. The introduction of cardinal preferences 
into the electoral market makes demand curves as expressed in vote 
totals more reflective of the "true demand" of a pluralistic political 
society, and therefore more competitive (Cole, Taebel, and Engstrom 
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1990). Also, cumulative voting has relatively low entry barriers, causing 
real and potential competition to increase. Foremost among these is its 
low exclusion threshold which encourages candidates who may have a 
smaller following to enter a race. Institutional barriers will also be lower 
to the degree that a more differentiated government monopoly will face 
higher marginal costs in producing legislation, thus will be unable to pass 
competition restricting rules (Crain, Holcombe, and Tollison 1979). In 
addition, the preservation of natural political boundaries eliminates the 
barriers erected by arbitrary apportionment. Finally, the tendency away 
from stable two party competition will reduce the possibility of political 
collusion that prevents third parties from effectively entering the 
process and will diminish the institutionalized political party barriers. 
Differentiation will occur in a cumulative voting system because 
there is no presumption of two party or two candidate competition, thus 
Cox's formulation that multiple candidate races will not converge holds 
(1987). In fact, "the Eaton-Lipsey analysis demonstrates the limited 
generalizability of Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation." Thus 
firms in multiple candidate races, "... need not collectively confront the 
consumer with 'an excessive sameness.'" (Shepsle and Cohen 1990, 20). In 
fact, it is suggested by Myerson that in elections where multiple seats are 
at stake Hotelling's contention that candidate dispersion is the most 
optimal outcome for consumers holds. Furthermore, Cox claims that any 
system utilizing cumulation will be dominated by centrifugal forces. Thus, 
competitors in CV will spread out along the policy continuum, rather than 
bunching at the median position, thereby presenting the electorate with a 
more differentiated product. 
Evaluation 
Application of the industrial organization model to the case of 
cumulative voting makes clear two prominent aspects of CV, its strong 
------. 
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competitiveness and its tendency toward differentiation. Thus, completely 
in opposition to SMD above, CV has vigorous competition, both in terms of 
quantity and quality. Also, the electoral phenomena of accurate 
representation and minority representation are benefited by CV as 
candidates are more differentiated, voters' demand is better met and 
those not in the majority gain representation. The consequences for the 
criteria qualities are significant. Efficient and democratic competition 
are clearly improved. Likewise, democratic and fair representation is 
furthered by greater accuracy, minority inclusion, and increased 
differentiation. Furthermore, participation is improved as more 
competitive races among more representative candidates bring more 
people into the political system. Also, a group of legislators beholden to 
more of society will be more responsive. Finally, as inclusion, 
deliberation, and competition increase in the political system, government 
policies will become more fair. 
V. Analysis and Other Considerations 
Now that the industrial organization model has been elaborated, its 
implications, as well as other factors relevant to the cumulative voting 
single member district comparison can be assessed. This examination will 
proceed by drawing out what electoral phenomena are affected and how, so 
that judgements can be made about the advantages and disadvantages of 
each system with respect to the criteria. 
A. Single Member Districts 
The widespread use of the single member district plurality rule 
system results from some particularly beneficial qualities that the 
system possesses in terms of representation and governance. SMD's 
strongest trait is its ability to represent the geographical groups within a 
geopolitical area. Also, the narrowed jurisdiction of single member 
districts, as opposed to a simple at-large system, allows and encourages 
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constituency participation because of the head to head nature of the 
election and its local flavor. Furthermore, a representative of a district is 
more likely to share the feelings of his/her constituency because the 
representative's election depends on the district's perception of him/her 
and the representative is likely to reside in the district, and thus will 
tend to share many of the constituent preferences. Finally, the 
representative will seem to be more accessible to constituents who can 
geographically identify the person who specifically represents them and 
will tend to form closer and stronger relationships with constituents 
(Weaver 1984; Guinier 1993; Dunn 1972). 
In addition to the geopolitical benefits of SMD, stable two party 
governance is a consequence of the winner-take-all nature of plurality 
rule, which awards sole political representation of an entire district to 
the plurality winner, no matter how fractured the electorate is. In other 
words, a SMD plurality system tends to promote stability by not reflecting 
many of the divisions within the electorate. Also, SMD plurality rule is 
simple for the voter because of the smaller candidate pool with which 
they must become familiar and the straightforward nature of casting a 
single vote for the most preferred candidate.19 
A third area of benefit comes in terms of minority representation. 
SMD uses the geographic clustering of minorities that frequently occurs 
due to voluntary and involuntary segregation to create districts in which 
minorities are a majority. Districts drawn thus will provide minorities 
with opportunities to elect their own representatives that may not have 
existed in an at-large system. The enforcement of the Voting Rights Act 
by the Federal government through the use of SMD to correct minority vote 
dilution reflects this beneficial trait (Weaver 1984; Grofman et al 1982; 
19Voting for the most preferred candidate is the optimal strategy for a two candidate race, the 
usual arrangement. Other strategies will be discussed below. 
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Guinier 1994). Furthermore, the fact that these seats are often times so 
lopsided to ensure minority representation makes these districts safe 
seats from which minority legislators can gain power and influence 
through the seniority system (Guinier 1993). 
On the other hand, SMD suffers from some shortcomings as well. The 
geopolitical benefits discussed above have a negative side. Close ties 
between representatives and constituents also produce representatives 
with overly parochial concerns and allow obscure district politics to go 
unscrutinized. Even more fundamentally, however, creating geographic 
districts is well suited as a strategy to extend representation only to the 
extent that interests are predominantly geographic. Although this may 
have been true at one time, geography is no more determinative of 
political preferences than race, gender, or income today. In addition, 
districting for SMD tends to arbitrarily divide geopolitical entities, 
seemingly driven only to create equally populated districts (Weaver 1984; 
Guinier 1994; Note 1982). 
This type of districting is inherently political, leading to 
gerrymandering that can destroy any sense of community cohesiveness in 
the name of political advantage. Furthermore, this political advantage 
becomes the cause of numerous and worthless political battles that waste 
the time of legislatures and courts. Also, when racial gerrymandering 
occurs, as it often does, a climate of racially based politics is created 
that polarizes communities. The adversarial nature of politics, implicit in 
this polarization is extended by the electoral focus and negative 
campaigning that are part of head to head, winner take all contests 
(Guinier 1993; Note 1982). 
In terms of minority representation, SMD makes two crucial, yet not 
completely accurate or helpful, assumptions. First, it is assumed that 
geography is a proxy for racial or ethnic minorities, and second that race 
•
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or ethnicity is a proxy for political preferences. Racial and ethnic 
minorities are not always geographically segregated, Latinos in the 
Southwest are an example. Nor do all voters within a particular minority 
have the political leanings that are projected on them as a group. 
Therefore, single member districting is a weak strategy for improving 
minority representation. Strangely, SMD places the government in the 
position of defining political groups and assigning them political views. 
Likewise, because the entire concept of districting to create certain 
majorities necessarily creates other minorities, at least one group's 
voting strength is arbitrarily being diluted when government creates a 
district to combat the vote dilution facing another group. In the face of 
this, even a government concerned with fairness would have to choose 
which groups have the right to representation and in what amounts.20 
In addition, achieving representation through racially gerrymandered 
SMDs may be harmful to minority interests. Minority representation 
becomes only token in the sense that government segregates minorities . 
into a few districts only to ignore the representatives from those 
districts. This is further exacerbated by fact that packing minorities into 
certain districts leaves the rest of the districts overwhelmingly white 
and without any reason to even consider minority issues.21 Furthermore, it 
is completely unproductive from a social justice standpoint to perpetuate· 
segregation by creating electoral structures that increase disincentives 
to integrate America's geopolitical entities and make it unnecessary for 
candidates to appeal to groups other than their own. Finally, single 
member districting can and has been used to dilute minority voting 
20ln United Jewish Organizations v. Carey (1977) this was precisely the issue. In creating a 
minority majority black district in New York a minority majority Jewish district had to be 
dismantled, causing quite a conflict between calls tor fair representation among both groups. 
211n fact, recent gains by the Republicans, especially the more conservative wing, can be 
partially contributed to the concentration of minority voters in particular districts. 
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strength in the same way it is used to dilute majority political 
monopolization. This is exactly how the majority monopolizes the 
political system in the first place. (Guinier 1994; Cole, Taebel, and 
Engstrom 1987; Note 1982; Guinier 1993; Still 1991). 
Also, the stable two party government resulting from winner-take­
all plurality rule prevents any third party from reinvigorating the 
political process, denies minorities, broadly defined, a voice in their 
representation, makes it too simple to maintain safe districts, over 
represents the majoritY,22 results in excessively centrist representation, 
and wastes the votes of at least up to half the electorate.23 (Weaver 1984; 
Grofman et al 1982; Still 1984; Guinier 1994; Note 1982). 
Industrial Organization Analysis 
Many of the considerations raised above about SMD can be analyzed 
within the industrial organization model set out in the previous section. 
Attributes such as stable two party competition and a smaller candidate 
pool are analogous to the restricted number of firms that exist in 
oligopoly. Likewise, the lack of third party competition, exclusion of 
minorities, broadly defined, and the safe district phenomenon accurately 
describe the market power to erec~ entry barriers and exclude competition 
that is part of oligopoly. In addition, the creation of minority majority 
districts represents the kind of artificial product differentiation that 
large oligopolists engage in to enlarge the scope of the market. Under this 
interpretation minority majority districts are an effort by the established 
oligopolists to extend their control over minorities. Also, the popularity 
and ease of SMD elections that arises from familiar, head to head contests 
22The cube law predicts that the majority party will be over represented because (l-S)/S = 
[( 1-V)/V1K where S is the percentage of seats won by the party, and V is the percentage votes 
received by the party and K is 3, when two parties have 90% of the vote (Still 1984). 
23A wasted vote can be defined as avote that does not elect a candidate. Thus any vote that does 
not go to a winner is wasted. 
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is akin to the familiar name recognition oligopolists enjoy. Market power 
in an oligopoly also reshapes demand and allows firms to deviate from the 
optimal point of production for consumers, just as SMD reshapes voter 
demand by having winner take all elections and making assumptions about 
voter preferences in racial gerrymandering. Finally, the excessive 
sameness and overly centrist government inspired by SMD is similar to the 
excessive blandness, similarity, mass appeal that is associated with a 
large oligopolist's products. 
Evaluation 
Single member district plurality rule influences all of the electoral 
phenomena. It lacks accuracy in terms of representation because 
geographic representation is a poor predictor of shared political interest, 
a winner take all system doesn't reflect the true extent society's 
divisions, the majority is over represented, and elected representatives 
are disproportionately centrist, politically speaking. SMD's poor showing 
in terms of accurate representation has implications for evaluation by the 
criteria qualities. Inaccuracy reflects SMD's inadequacy as to fair and 
democratic representation since it significantly skews voter interests. 
Also, inaccurate representation makes a political system less responsive 
because it can ignore significant segments of the electorate. 
SMD has a mixed effect on minority representation. It improves 
minority representation in that minority majority districts are commonly 
drawn and often turn out to be safe districts. Nevertheless, minority 
representation is harmed in that winner take all districts still create 
unrepresented minorities of some sort and any minority representation is 
only token. Also, SMD involves the government in making assumptions 
about minorities and perpetuating segregation. As was mentioned above, 
SMD is a weak strategy for minority representation, thus it only weakly 
fulfills the qualities of fair and democratic representation. Also, the 
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tokenism and segregation involved in the system decreases the likelihood 
of fair policy outcomes and reduces the richness of democratic 
competition. 
SMD has several effects on political behavior. First, there are 
effects related the scope and closeness of representative constituent 
relations. This type of relationship promotes responsiveness and 
participation through familiarity, on the positive side, but harms 
democratic competition and representation through the presence of 
narrow, obscure, local politics, on the negative side. In addition, the lack 
of third parties and the overly centrist bias in SMD, despite its 
commendable tendency for stability, limits competition, responsiveness, 
representation, and participation, all to the detriment of the electorate. 
Furthermore, the chances of fair policies and democratic competition are 
impaired by the adversarial nature of SMD that pits group against group in 
fights over who is entitled to a district and turns campaigning and 
politics into a disgustingly negative process. 
The effects of the increased districting in SMD are omnipresent. 
Beyond, its contribution to the kind of narrow minded representation that 
is detrimental to democratic competition, SMD's smaller districts limit 
efficient competition. Also, the inevitable potiticization of the process 
and the subsequent legal and legislative battles further harm democratic . 
competition. And, the necessary chore of choosing among groups for 
representation limits the chances of having fair and democratic 
representation. 
SMD both encourages and discourages participation. Head to head 
contests and simple voting aid participation, but the large number of 
wasted votes and centrist electoral bias drive disaffected voters away. 
Thus the result for participation is ambiguous. SMD's tendency toward two 
party competition, its winner take all decision rule, and the prevalence of 
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safe seats contribute to stability, despite any drawbacks for other 
qualities such as responsiveness or competition. The lack of strategy 
involved in SMD promotes democratic and fair representation. 
Finally, as already mentioned, competition in SMD is limited by safe 
districts, the absence of third parties, its centrist tendency, and the high 
exclusion threshold. Predictably, this adversely affects democratic 
competition, but it also harms representation by limiting the electorate's 
choices and participation through less competitive elections. 
B. Cumulative Voting 
Cumulative voting is appealing for a number of reasons. 
Geopolitically speaking, CV provides broader public interested 
representatives because of their larger, less localized constituencies. It 
leaves intact the "natural" political entities, allowing voluntary districts 
to form, constituted by voters of similar interests based solely on their 
individual political views rather than their geographic location or race. 
This allows voters to form cross-geographic alliances to unite voters 
with similar views previously submerged within separate districts. In 
conjunction with these alliances, the ability of CV voters to express their 
intensity of preference, eliminates the problem of minority submersion 
and vote dilution by allowing all interests to be heard in the political 
process (Still 1991; Guinier 1994; Note 1982; Still 1992; Weaver 1984; 
Kaplan 1993; Duncan 1993). 
Furthermore, CV reduces the politicking involved in drawing and 
redrawing district lines and picking which group is the majority in each 
district because the extent of CV jurisdiction is defined by natural 
geopolitical divisions and is color blind. In addition, the multiplicity of 
represented interests and the importance of consensus fosters more and 
better debate in political institutions and society (Kaplan 1994). 
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CV also improves the electoral prospects for minority voters, both 
narrowly and broadly defined. First, not having to rely on geography allows 
minority voting power to be felt even when that minority is not 
residentially segregated. Second, the elimination of race districting 
allows minorities to seek out cross-cultural alliances with sympathizers 
who may have been submerged in a majority district otherwise. Third, the 
low exclusion threshold and the cumulative option make minority 
representation more possible. CV also allows government to stay out of 
the business of making assumptions about preferences and choosing among 
minority groups, and eliminates the need to perpetuate segregation. In 
addition, minority politicians gain experience in appealing to broader 
constituencies and all politicians have to be aware of minorities in their 
districts. Finally inclusion enhances the legitimacy of the body being 
elected by giving everyone an effective voice in government (Still 1991; 
Guinier 1994; Note 1982; Still 1992; PiIdes 1993). 
Finally, CV causes the legislative body to be more proportionally 
representative of the electorate, and therefore a more true reflection of 
the voters· preferences. There are less wasted votes because more voters 
voted for a winner, and consequently more individuals have a 
representative in the legislature. Similarly, CV induces voter 
participation among those formerly submerged in IIsafe ll districts, and 
those previously alienated by the majoritarian bias of SMD plurality rule. 
Finally, the existence of multiple open seats creates a low exclusion 
threshold that encourages more candidates, as well as a larger variety of 
candidates to run for office. (Guinier 1994; Note 1982; Weaver 1984; Still 
1992; Everson et al 1982; Still 1991). 
Cumulative voting also has drawbacks, however. Because it is more 
proportional, CV tends to be less stable as various groups battle for 
control. Furthermore, the procedures involved with CV can be confusing 
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and voters must become familiar with a larger number of candidates,
 
which can lead to an inaccurate vote. In addition, the fact that no
 
representative is formally bound to a defined constituency could lead to a
 
distance between voters and legislators that would be detrimental.
 
Finally, CV can entail major use of strategy by parties, candidates, and
 
voters in ways that may not be beneficial (Note 1982; Weaver 1984;
 
Everson et al 1982).
 
Industrial Organization Analysis
 
Just as the issues raised about SMD could be analyzed within the 
industrial organization paradigm, the same can be done with respect to 
CV. The increased number of candidates and interests involved in CV is 
analogous to the greater number of firms in a monopolistically 
competitive market. The inclusion of minorities, the more proportionate 
representation of the electorate, and the increased variety of candidates 
speak to the differentiation that is common to monopolistic competition. 
In addition, just as monopolistically competitive firms must follow 
consumer demand with little deviation, CV's preference intensity 
revelation, its opportunity to form voluntary districts, and its avoidance 
of government assumptions about preferences cause it to more accurately 
reflect voter demand. The absence of safe districts and the low exclusion 
threshold is akin to the low entry barriers and the ease with which 
monopolistically competitive firms enter the market. Also, CV's wide 
variety of candidates and the voluntary districting they attempt to inspire 
is similar to the wide variety of firms and the market niches they try to 
create. The increased participation CV fosters, especially among formerly 
disaffected segments of the electorate, corresponds to the expansion of 
the edges of a highly competitive market. Finally, the sometimes 
excessive competition in CV is analogous to the occasional bouts of over 
competition that plague monopolistically competitive industries. 
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Evaluation 
Cumulative voting's implications for the electoral phenomena are 
significant and therefore provide strong basis upon which CV can be 
evaluated by the criteria qualities. A high degree of accurate 
representation is provided by CV through its proportionality, the fact that 
preference intensity can be expressed, and the ability of voters to form 
voluntary constituencies based on shared interest. Accuracy promotes fair 
and democratic representation by better reflecting more of society's 
preferences. Also, accuracy encourages better responsiveness and more 
efficient competition by reflecting the true will of the citizens. 
Perhaps the electoral phenomena CV affects most is minority 
representation. Minority representation is improved by the fact that a low 
exclusion threshold gives those not in the majority representation, 
preference intensity allows minorities the right to express the strength 
of their preferences, and voluntary districting eliminates the problem of 
vote dilution and opens up possibilities for alliances. Furthermore, the 
color blind approach CV takes reduces racial polarization, the 
perpetuation of segregation, and government political assumptions and 
choices concerning minorities. Clearly, this makes representation more 
democratic and fair, as inclusion promotes society wide representation. In 
addition, inclusion fosters deliberation and consensus, while preventing 
majority monopolization, which enhances democratic competition and the 
fairness of policy outcomes. 
Similarly, CV also improves the quality of political behavior. 
Broader constituencies provide public interested representatives. 
Inclusion and competition increase the value and necessity of 
deliberation, consensus, and compromise, thereby improving democratic 
competition, representation, and policy. Voters can participate in cross 
cultural or geographic alliances based on shared interest, consequently 
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bettering participation and democratic competition and representation. 
The viability of new parties in CV promotes constant political 
reinvigoration enhancing responsiveness and democratic competition. And 
the political system's legitimacy is improved when all segments of 
society, especially minorities can effectively participate, thus improving 
policies and representation. 
Districting is conspicuously absent in CV. By allowing voluntary 
constituencies to form within natural geopolitical boundaries, much of the 
animosity and politics that surround districting disappear. In turn, this 
improves democratic and efficient competition by allowing substantive 
issues dominate political debate and eliminating a degree of polarization. 
Representation also improves as larger districts contribute to broader 
minded representatives. Participation in CV is affected by the decrease in 
the safe seat phenomenon, the added candidate differentiation, and the 
ability of geographically dispersed voters to unite voluntarily. Each of 
these reflects positively on the criteria quality of participation, as well 
as democratic and fair representation. In terms of stability, CV's 
additional competition and minority representation reduce political 
stability, but can enhance responsiveness. Strategy, which will be dealt 
with more fully below, becomes a more complicated matter under CV, 
thereby deterring efficient and democratic competition and possibly fair 
representation as well. 
Finally, competition as an electoral phenomenon is affected by a 
lower exclusion threshold, fewer safe seats, and the prevalence of 
political differentiation. As mentioned above, these characteristics 
contribute to an increase in the quantity and quality of competitors, which 
in turn makes competition more democratic and efficient, as well as 
enhances democratic representation and participation by involving a 
greater diversity of people and interests in the political system. 
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c. Strategy 
One of the most important topics in evaluating an electoral system 
is the role strategy plays in the operation and outcomes of various 
systems. For SMD plurality rule, strategy is a relatively straight forward 
matter that has been investigated from many angles. Parties simply 
nominate the single candidate most likely to win the election. The high 
exclusion threshold and Duverger's law make it virtually inevitable that 
districts are dominated by a strong two party system that has the effect 
of eliminating individual candidate strategy as a significant factor. In 
addition, voter strategy is rather simple as well. In a two person election, 
clearly the most likely case, sincere voting24 is the optimal strategy. In 
cases of more than two candidate election, the fear of wasted votes 
drives the voter to choose the most preferred candidate among the two 
strongest ones. Thus, as a general rule voters in SMD reduce the candidate 
field to the two strongest competitors and then vote for the most 
preferable candidate (Brams 1975). 
The role of strategy in cumulative voting is significantly more 
complicated and not yet fully explored. Most of the difficultly results 
from the interaction of uncertainty on the part of parties, candidates, and 
voters in how to properly balance competing demands. Parties fully want 
to exploit their strength, but if too many of their candidates are 
competing, all their candidates could suffer. Furthermore, parties must 
organize and convince supporters to spread their votes equally among 
their candidates. For parties, a party dominated system seems optimal so 
they can effectively control candidates and voters. This allows parties to 
utilize game theory to maximize their chances based on past and expected 
vote shares, much as the Democratic and Republican parties in Illinois did 
24Sincere voting has voters choose for their most preferred alternative considering all the 
candidates before them and only the candidates before them. 
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when CV was used there. When parties control the process, game theoretic 
models can be constructed to show the optimal nomination strategies 
given a certain number of open seats and an expected vote total (Brams 
1975; Goldburg 1994; Sawyer and MacRae 1962; Broh 1974; Glasser 1959; 
Glazer, Glazer, and Grofman 1984). 
As alluded to above, however, CV will not tend toward a two party 
dominated system because cumulation and the low exclusion threshold 
make it possible for a more open system. Thus, candidates are more free 
to make their own strategic decisions and therefore have to deal with the 
issues of entry, campaign strategy, and voter instruction. Voters may have 
the most difficult strategic decisions because they must balance their 
votes between those candidates they most prefer, and those who need 
their votes the most. One optimal strategy for parties, candidates, and 
voters in CV is clear, however. Being organized is very important because 
it allows common interests to be recognized, their electoral strength 
judged, and maximizing instructions to be disseminated. Thus, the more . 
organized a society's interests are, the more likely that strategy will help 
rather than hinder cumulative voting (Brams 1975). 
VI. Evidence 
To help provide a basis for the claim that cumulative voting is a 
better electoral system than SMD plurality rule in terms of competition, 
representation, and fairness, an experiment performed earlier this year, 
as well as the documented results of cumulative voting systems in 
practice can be examined. 
A. Experiment 
In order to approximate a voting situation, a ballot was constructed 
that asked subjects to choose among different types of music.25 In the 
experiment different music types substitute for candidates or political 
25see appendix 1 
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parties. It is thought that musical tastes will be a reasonable substitute 
because they are similar to political beliefs in that people have distinct 
preferences among different types, those preferences are many times 
strongly held and sometimes culturally correlated, and there are 
identifiable majority and minority preferences. On each of the two sides 
of the ballot the subjects use a different electoral system. On the left 
side, a single member district plurality rule system is employed by 
dividing the total population into five equally populated, color coded, 
districts and asking the subject to vote for only one of the alternatives. 
On the right side, a cumulative voting system is employed by considering 
all ballots together, and asking the subject to distribute five votes among 
the alternatives as they please.26 
There are a number of limitations inherent in the experiment that 
prevent it from having complete predictive power, but there still are some 
important hypothesis that can be tested. First of all, the fact that the 
number of competitors, and therefore the level of competition, is 
determined by the possible candidates' interaction with and relationship 
to the specific electorate prevents it from being measured by this 
experiment, which takes the number and identity of the candidates as 
given. It is hypothesized that the results for the SMD plurality rule side of 
the ballot will be undifferentiated among districts because subjects were 
not geographically segregated for the purposes of the experiment. In other 
words, the same music alternatives will tend to win in each district. 
Furthermore, the SMD system will be relatively unreflective of the total 
population's demand because it will choose a single winner from each 
district and voters are restricted to choosing only one alternative. On the 
other hand, CV results will be more differentiated because the system 
26The specific procedures followed are identical to the procedures laid out in the SMD and CV 
sections of this study, supra. 
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evaluates the population's preferences at-large, rather than on a district 
by district basis. In addition, CV will be more reflective of true demand 
because the winners will be the top five alternatives in the entire 
population and the voters can reflect the intensity of their preferences. 
Table 1 
SMD Plurality Rule 
Red Blue Yellow Orange Purple Total 
Hard/Classic Rock 6 4 4 6 10 30 
Soft Rock 2 5 7 10 24 
Oldies 2 3 3 8 
Alternative 5 5 18 21 1 1 60 
Pop 2 2 4 10 18 
Heavy Metal 3 2 2 7 
R & B/Soul 1 2 1 2 3 9 
Rap 1 1 
Christian/Gospel 4 2 7 13 
Country 2 2 2 3 5 14 
Easy Listening 1 2 3 
Latin 1 1 2 
Classical 1 3 3 7 
Jazz 2 1 1 4 
Dance 0 
Folk 1 1 2 
Other 1 1 
Total 21 26 44 56 56 203 
The results for the SMD plurality rule side of the ballot are 
presented in Table 1. They largely confirm the hypotheses. There are only 
two different winners, and there was almost only one. Alternative music 
won four of the five districts, with Hard/Classic Rock taking the 
remaining one. This result confirms the hypothesis that the winners would 
be greatly undifferentiated. Likewise, the hypothesis that the winners 
would be unreflective of the demand of the population was also confirmed. 
80.0% of the seats (4/5) went to Alternative music which garnered only 
29.6% of the total votes (60/203). Furthermore, Soft Rock which got 11.8% 
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of the vote (24/203) was totally excluded from representation, as were 
55.7% of the entire electorate «203-90)/203). The results show how the 
the two most popular kinds of music can totally exclude all other kinds 
from representation. This tendency would only be exaggerated if it were 
assumed, as is reasonable, that some of the low vote getters would not 
enter the race at all, thereby forcing their voters to vote for the more 
popular choices. 
Table 2
 
Cumulative Voting
 
Red Blue Yellow Orange Purple Total 
Hard/Classic Rock 24 19 26 31 37 137 
Soft Rock 5 14 17 30 35 101 
Oldies 4 4 14 29 22 73 
Alternative 25 20 59 63 52 219 
Pop 5 11 16 23 35 90 
Heavy Metal 16 11 7 4 6 44 
R & B/Soul 5 10 6 13 14 48 
Rap 4 4 7 4 4 23 
Christian/Gospel 1 9 9 25 7 51 . 
Country 8 7 18 16 25 74 
Easy Listening 3 3 8 12 26 
Latin 1 9 6 3 19 
Classical 5 5 18 11 11 50 
Jazz 7 1 11 13 12 44 
Dance 2 2 1 5 
Folk 2 2 
Other 9 1 4 14 
Total 110 129 221 280 280 1020 
For Cumulative Voting the results of the experiment are presented in 
Table 2. Five different choices won, Hard/Classic Rock, Soft Rock, 
Alternative, Pop, and Country, thus on its face CV seems to produce more 
differentiated results. Likewise, demand is more truly reflected because 
the five winners each gained 20% of the seats and their vote percentages 
varied from from 21.5% for Alternative (219/1020) to 7.3% for Country 
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(74/1020). The biggest loser was Oldies, which gained 7.2% (73/1020), 
yet did not receive a seat. Both of these results reflect favorably when 
compared to SMD plurality, where the largest deviation between seats and 
votes was 50.4% (80.0-29.6), as compared to 12.7% (20.0-7.3) for 
cumulative voting. Similarly the biggest loser in SMD had 11 .8% of the 
vote, whereas in cumulative voting the Oldies had 7.2%. The most telling 
comparison of demand revelation and representativeness is between the 
percentages of the electorate that did not vote for a winner. In SMD 55.7% 
of the people were without representation, but in CV only 3.9% of voters 
(8/203) did not vote for a winner.27 Thus almost the entire population had 
at least one representative for whom they voted. Although the incentive to 
drop out would be less, it can be assumed that some of the lower vote 
getters would not run, and again their votes would more than likely go to 
the most popular candidates, probably reducing the deviation between 
seats and votes. Overall the results, at least initially, strongly confirm 
the hypotheses. 
One shortcoming of the experiment diminishes the confidence that 
can be placed on the differentiated hypothesis conclusion. Within the 
experiment there is some ambiguity in whether the musical types are 
parties or candidates. Overall, however, a music type corresponds best to 
a political party because a candidate takes on qualities of a party, just as 
a song takes on qualities of a music type. In dealing with SMD, this 
ambiguity is not much of a problem because it is assumed that each party 
will run one and only one candidate in each district. Thus the results for 
the first side of the ballot are still highly relevant because the party is an 
accurate proxy for the candidate. For CV, however, there is a problem. A 
successful party, the Alternative party for instance, would run multiple 
27Although 39.1 % of the votes cast (399/1020) did not go for winners, of the 203 people who 
voted only 8 did not have a winner among their choices. 
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candidates in a CV election in hopes of capturing more than one seat. This 
experiment could not simulate the effect of having multiple candidates 
from the same music type run in the same election. It could be assumed 
however that the Alternative party, with a reasonably good estimation of 
its support would run two candidates. Other parties may try this, but none 
would be as successful as the Alternative party because they would run 
the risk of splitting their vote so as to cause both of their candidates to 
lose. If they did send two candidates and they split the alternative vote, 
each would still be elected with about 110 votes apiece, thereby giving 
Alternative supporters two seats and taking away the Country seat. 
Ultimately, this would reduce the differentiatedness of CV, but still not 
to the degree of SMD. Another consequence of the single party multiple 
candidate aspect of CV, is that it stresses the importance of accurately 
being able to estimate popularity and plan strategy, so that a party or 
people of a certain political leaning could gauge how many candidates to 
run in an election. Overall, despite these changes, CV still produces a more 
differentiated and representative group of winners than SMD. 
Evaluation 
The results of the experiment support the claims that CV is more 
representative and produces more differentiation. Increased 
representativeness signals effects for the electoral phenomena of 
accurate representation and minority representation. In terms of 
accuracy, the experiment shows how CV is more proportional than SMD 
with respect to the deviation between seats and votes. The resulting 
increased accuracy improves democratic and fair representation by better 
reflecting voter preferences as representative choices and enhances the 
responsiveness of a political system by making it more of a reflection of 
true voter will. For minority representation, the experiment showed how 
CV can break majority monopolization of the representative system by 
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including groups not in the majority. This effect bolsters democratic and 
fair representation by including a wider segment of society in the 
representative system, as well as enhancing democratic competition by 
allow a more diverse set of voices to be heard in the political system. 
B. Real World 
Since its inception, cumulative voting has primarily been seen as a 
practical and fair way to vote in jurisdictions that cannot agree to a 
voting procedure because of the fear of factionalism or majority tyranny. 
In its first real-world usages on the local level in parts of England and in 
South Africa toward the end of the nineteenth century, the results were 
generally favorable, allowing minorities to be represented and reducing 
factionalism. CV was also tried for a short time in Pennsylvania for 
municipal elections during the 1870s and in Chile around the turn of the 
century where the system was less successful and shorter lived. 
Furthermore, throughout this era CV was proposed and debated, but 
ultimately not adopted, for a number of legislatures including those in 
South Carolina, North Carolina, and New York City, as well as the in the 
House of Representatives and the Senate (Blair 1973; Dunn 1972; Seymour 
and Frary 1918; Lakeman 1974,87-90; Moore 1919; Still 1991). 
Throughout these instances, CV was considered or put into use primarily 
because of its beneficial consequences for minorities. 
The most sustained usage of cumulative voting, however, is found in 
Illinois where the system was used to elect the lower body of the 
legislature between 1872 and 1980. Originally instituted to mitigate the 
geopolitical polarization of the state into a pro-union Republican northern 
half and a anti-union Democratic southern half following the civil war, CV 
was designed to address "the injustice and inequalities of majority rule" 
(Everson et al 1982, 5). The system "worked" in that it allowed the second 
party in each half of the state to have representation. Much of the 
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conjecture above concerning CV is also confirmed by the Illinois 
experience. Cumulative voting provided more proportional representation, 
did not over represent the majority, and increased the importance and role 
of the minority in governing (Blair 1973; Wiggins and Petty 1979; 
Kuklinski 1973; Everson et al 1982; Dunn 1972; Hyneman and Morgan 1937; 
Wiste 1980; Blair 1960). In addition, it is claimed that CV contributed to 
legislative stability by moderating majority dominance and not 
magnifying or exaggerating changes in popular support the way plurality 
rule does (Kuklinski 1973). 
CV did not work flawlessly in Illinois, however. It suffered from 
limited competition and failed to encourage any significant third party 
participation. The complaints of non-competitiveness and a lack of 
candidates and parties, however, are not clearly related to CV itself but 
rather seem to be a function of strong party control, high party allegiance, 
and collusion in the political process.28 Competition was controlled by 
District Representative Committees (ORCs) through their power to 
determine the number of nominees for each party (Wiste 1980; Blair 1958; 
Dunn 1972; Blair 1960). There is strong evidence that the ORCs, commonly 
made up of incumbents running for re-election, from each party colluded 
to "set up" elections and eliminate the possibility of competition. 
Considering this and the overwhelming strength parties had over voters, 
candidates, and the process itself during the time CV was in use, much of 
the anti-competitive experience in Illinois can be considered a function of 
factors specific to Illinois and not related to CV. In fact, the vigorous 
competition in direct primaries, where parties did not choose the number 
of candidates, attests to the fundamentally competitive nature of CV that 
unfortunately was obscured in general elections (Wiggins and Petty 1979; 
28For instance, in the primaries, where parties could not dictate the number and identity of the 
candidates were hotly contested and were generally more competitive than those in other states 
(Everson 1982, 8). 
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Hyneman and Morgan 1937). Furthermore, the reasons for the system's 
repeal in 1980 were connected primarily to voter anger over a pay 
increase, rather substantive complaints about the system itself. The 
conclusion reached by many scholars is that CV in Illinois did "prevent the 
tyranny of an overwhelming majority" (Everson et al 1982; Kuklinski 
1973). 
Cumulative voting has also enjoyed use by corporations to elect 
boards of directors. Currently six states29 make CV mandatory, and it is 
permitted in the others (Gordon 1994). Only about 15% of corporations, 
however, use cumulative voting (Vagts 1989). Considering this and the 
fact that in the last twenty years corporations have successfully 
petitioned states to eliminate mandatory CV, it is clear that corporations 
do not like CV. Primarily their dislike is motivated by the same things 
that make CV attractive as an electoral system in the first place: 
minority inclusion and competition. Management, perhaps to the detriment 
of stockholders,30 believes that minority inclusion and competition 
introduce divisiveness and open the door for corporate takeovers. Thus 
CV's unpopularity in the corporate world is a result of the existence of the 
qualities that recommend CV as a useful electoral system in politics 
(Guinier 1994; Glazer, Glazer, and Grofman 1984; Cary 1980; Choper, 
Coffee, and Morris 1989; Vagts 1989). 
The most recent uses of CV have come in response to violations of 
the Voting Rights Act's prohibition against minority vote dilution. In 
Alamogordo, New Mexico, where Latinos and Blacks have seen their votes 
diluted and the lack of geographic segregation prevents effective 
districting, CV is being employed to ensure better minority 
29Arizona, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and West Virginia.
 
30lt has been suggested that eliminating CV has a detrimental effect on a company's stock
 
(Bhagat and Brickley 1984).
 
• 
44 
representation. The institution of the system resulted in a Latino woman 
being elected at-large in two consecutive elections, mostly on the 
strength of Latino voters (Cole, Taebel, and Engstrom 1990; Engstrom, 
Taebel, Cole 1989; Cole and Taebel 1992). Likewise, a school district in 
South Dakota has seen positive results, in terms of Native American 
representation, by changing to cumulative voting (Engstrom and 
Barrilleaux 1991). Also, blacks in Peoria, Illinois have been able to 
achieve representation on the city council thanks to cumulative voting 
(Van Biema 1994, AP 1987). Finally, some Alabama localities, including 
Chilton County, have experimented with cumulative voting to increase 
black representation. Surprisingly, not only did black representation jump 
after the institution of this system, but the Republicans, another under­
represented group in rural Alabama, also increased their representation 
(Still 1992). The modern real world uses of CV also suggest that confusion 
is an insignificant factor and the system quickly gains popularity as its 
superiority to racially gerrymandered districts for all concerned becomes 
apparent (Cole and Taebel 1992). 
The ability of CV to confer its representative and competitive 
benefits with out the many times divisive and convoluted racial 
gerrymandering necessary to solve vote dilution cases in SMD, has made it 
a popular option recently. In Worcester County, Maryland a federal judge 
imposed cumulative voting for the election of the county commissioners 
because minorities are widely dispersed and an acceptable SMD system 
could not be created (Van Biema 1994; Buckley 1994). Also, cumulative 
voting has been suggested as a remedy to the ongoing reapportionment 
battles taking place over North Carolina's US House districts.31 It has been 
proposed that North Carolina be divided into three CV districts along 
county lines, thereby providing blacks with an opportunity to elect at 
31 Currently proceeding through the courts as Shaw v. Hunt 
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least three representatives, demographically speaking (Kaplan 1994).
 
Together, the evidence of cumulative voting usage indicates that it is an
 
effective tool for improving minority representation.
 
Evaluation
 
The evidence concerning cumulative voting arising from the real 
world uses of the system delineates the effects for a number of electoral 
phenomena. First, it is clear from the modern and historical examples that 
CV enhances minority representation. Increased inclusion promotes 
democratic and fair representation, as well as democratic competition 
and policy fairness by preventing majority dominance and inspiring 
deliberation and consensus. The attested to proportionality of CV also 
promotes accurate representation, thereby further illustrating CV's 
democratic and fair approach to representation. 
The evidence of CV's ability to de-politicize apportionment and 
reduce polarization shows the improved political behavior that results 
from CV. This kind of political behavior creates a more democratically 
competitive polity by focusing on consensus and the substantive issues. 
Also, surprisingly, real world uses of CV suggest that in one sense 
CV is more stable, thereby suggesting that CV may not rate so badly in the 
stability criteria quality. Likewise, some evidence pointed to the 
unexpected conclusion that CV was uncompetitive, but mitigating factors' 
and contrary evidence make it impossible to make any claims about 
competition concerning the real world uses. 
VII. Conclusion 
This study of cumulative voting and single member district plurality 
rule attempted to use a novel application of industrial organization 
economic theory to explain why cumulative voting is a superior electoral 
system. The industrial organization paradigm, by providing concepts, such 
as oligopoly, monopolistic competition, and entry barriers, lends further 
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insight into the advantages of cumulative voting, in terms of competition, 
representation, and fairness. By positing SMD plurality rule as an 
oligopolistic political market structure and CV as monopolistically 
competitive one, it was hypothesized that CV is more competitive, 
representative, and fair, as an electoral system. In light of the 
evaluations in Section IV, V, and VI, CV is superior to SMD in the qualities 
of competition, representation, responsiveness, participation, and policy 
outcomes, and inferior to SMD only in terms of stability. Overall, it seems 
clear that the hypothesis is confirmed and cumulative voting is more 
efficient, democratic, and fair than single member district plurality 
voting. This conclusion was buttressed by many theoretical arguments 
coming from the literature surrounding voting rights, public choice, and 
voting theory. Furthermore, a voting experiment, despite its shortcomings, 
provided some empirical evidence supporting the conclusion. And finally, 
the field research done on actual instances of cumulative voting usage 
also lends credence to the conclusions drawn. Certainly further research 
is needed empirically concerning cumulative voting, and as more localities 
become more familiar with CV, the evidence surrounding its real world 
effects will improve. But, policy implications can be drawn from this 
preliminary study. 
Cumulative voting should be considered as a viable electoral 
strategy for all types and levels of elections that simultaneously elect 
multiple candidates. This would as a whole improve American elections, in 
terms of representation, competition, and fairness, three qualities that 
are essential to a well functioning democracy. This recommendation can 
be taken further for those localities that are experiencing destructive 
factionalism or minority exclusion and majority dominance. Simply put, 
cumulative voting should be instituted as soon as possible in these areas 
because although not a panacea, it certainly has proved useful in equitably 
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easing the tensions that arise in those situations. As the United States 
moves toward a more integrated, culturally diverse future, cumulative 
voting should prove to be an integral part of the American electoral 
system. 
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Appendix 1 
Student Senate Music Survey 
What kind of music do you want at dances? in concert? on the radio? 
Vote on both sides of ballot please. 
You have five votes to distribute 
however you like. You can cast one 
vote for each of five different 
choices, five votes for one choice, 
or any combination in between (eg. 
Vote for one only three votes for one choice and one 
vote for each of two other 
choices) 
Hard/Classic Rock Hard/Classic Rock 
Soft Rock Soft Rock
 
Oldies
 Oldies
 
Alternative
 Alternative
 
Pop
 Pop
 
Heavy Metal
 Heavy Metal
 
R & B/Soul
 R & B/Soul
 
Rap
 Rap
 
Christian/Gospel
 Christian/Gospel
 
Country
 Country
 
Easy Listening
 Easy Listening
 
Latin
 Latin
 
Classical
 Classical
 
Jazz
 Jazz 
Return through Campus Mail to
 
Josh Yount
 
Student Senate
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